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After many years of theoretical and empirical research devoted to ex-
plaining unemployment by labor market imperfections, the focus has shifted
to credit markets. Recent developments in the US economy have played an
important role in this change of emphasis, as there is a widespread feeling
that ﬁnancial intermediaries have been a crucial ingredient of the “new eco-
nomy”, during both the initial phase of sustained growth and the second
stage of emblematic bankruptcies (e.g., Boo.com) and of sharp decline in
stock prices. Few macroeconomic models allow to deal with such complex
interactions between labor, credit and good markets. The Modigliani-Miller
paradigm, where the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm is irrelevant, is usually
adopted as a benchmark from which it is analytically diﬃcult to deviate.
In an earlier paper (Wasmer-Weil 2001), we have introduced a simple (trac-
table) double search model with stochastic frictions in labor and credit
markets, and argued that it might serve as a useful tool to understand the
impact of credit market imperfections on employment.1
This paper illustrates theoretically, through calibration and empiri-
cally how the aggregate labor market depends crucially on the ﬁnancial
intermediaries notably in phases of negative cash-ﬂows. For that, we ex-
tend the endogenous destruction version of our model (Wasmer and Weil,
2001, Section 6) to technological growth and ﬁnite variance of technological
shocks. We investigate the life-cycle of ﬁrms facing an initial period of deﬁcit,
optimistic anticipations of future proﬁts, and the need of being reﬁnanced
in case of transitory fall in demand of productivity. Business creation, credit
opening and job destruction represent three active margins of the model. We
ﬁnd that ﬁnancial imperfections lead to ﬁnancial fragility stemming from
∗ This paper was prepared for the conference “New Economy, Viability and Implications”, Université de Metz,
on April 27-28, 2001. We thank the participants for their comments. We also thank Asa Rosen for her careful
reading of the paper.
1 See also the subsequent paper of Acemoglu (2000).
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negative initial cash-ﬂows and the need for the ﬁrm to be reﬁnanced by its
investors in bad times. This acts as a forth, latent margin : by latent, we
mean that it is not active and has no impact on the equilibrium. However,
it may strike if the agents decided to repudiate ﬁnancial contracts. In some
New Economy sectors, this would be the case if everyone realized, after hea-
ring “the King is naked”, that price-earnings ratios were abnormally high,
leading to immediate repudiation of old ﬁnancial contracts.
Furthermore, we establish that monetary policy matters more for fra-
gile ﬁrms since they are more dependent on the rates at which banks are
reﬁnanced. Finally, we attempt to test the model, by deriving a testable link
between venture capital and the aggregate labor market. We use a subset of
venture capital data compiled by Jeng and Wells (1998) for 17 OECD coun-
tries between 1986 and 1997 to investigate the dynamic correlations between
venture capital ﬂows and the unemployment rate in panel. As we will see,
the results are encouraging : unemployment depends negatively and signi-
ﬁcantly on venture capital ﬂows the year before, suggesting the presence
of lags, which justiﬁes ex-post our modelling approach. These results are
obtained regardless of the choice of the variable controls for the aggregate
cycle.
The paper is organized as follows : in Section 1, we introduce the con-
cepts of the model and derive the equilibrium along the three active margins.
In Section 2 we discuss further some aspects of the relation between ﬁnan-
ciers and entrepreneurs and establish the existence of the latent margin
described above. In Section 3 and 4, we propose a few quantitative illustra-
tions of macroeconomics of the model applied to the paradigm of the New
Economy, including the impact of monetary policy and the importance of
venture capital ﬂows.
1 The model
1.1 Setup
To analyze the role of credit market imperfections on unemployment, we
use the symmetric search framework introduced in Wasmer-Weil (2001). In
our earlier paper, we had shown that describing labor and credit market
imperfections by means of matching functions yields a parsimonious, yet
rich, macroeconomic model of unemployment. We brieﬂy present that mo-
del, which serves as our starting point here, and refer the reader to our
earlier work for further detail.
There are three types of agents : entrepreneurs, workers and ﬁnanciers.
Entrepreneurs have ideas, but need workers to transform them into output.
However, labor market frictions make it diﬃcult and costly for entrepreneurs
and workers to meet. Following Pissarides (1990), we summarize these diﬃ-
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culties by a constant returns to scale matching function h(U ,V) that “pro-
duces” a ﬂow of matches between ﬁrms and workers with two “inputs” : job
vacancies V posted by ﬁrms, and available (i.e., unemployed) workers U .2
Measuring labor market tightness (from the point of view of ﬁrms) by the
ratio θ = V/U , the instantaneous (Poisson) probability that an entrepreneur
ﬁnds a worker, h(U,V)V = h(θ
−1, 1) ≡ q(θ) is, quite naturally, decreasing the
tighter the labor market, i.e., the higher θ. The converse probability3 of a
worker ﬁnding an entrepreneur, θq(θ), is increasing in θ.
We assume that entrepreneurs do not have any ﬁnancial resources of
their own,4 so that they must ﬁnd, before they start searching for a wor-
ker, a ﬁnancier willing to pay a) for the cost of posting a job vacancy;
b) for the negative proﬁts of the ﬁrst initial period of the ﬁrm. Financial
frictions comes from a credit market matching function m(B, E) that pro-
duces matches between available bankers B and available entrepreneurs E .5
Measuring credit market tightness (again from the point of view of entrepre-
neurs) by φ = E/B, the probability that an entrepreneur ﬁnds a ﬁnancier
is m(B,E)E = m(φ
−1, 1) ≡ p(φ), which is decreasing in credit market tight-
ness φ. The converse probability that a ﬁnancier ﬁnds a worker, φp(φ), is of
course increasing in φ.
1.1.1 Technology
A ﬁrm can start producing only after its owner has found a worker. The
output of a ﬁrm has three components : an exogenous deterministic trend
egt (we assume it to be common to output and to all costs in the economy),
a random component ε, and ﬁnally a “variance” element captured by the
shift parameter σ > 0 : y = σεegt. With σ = 1 and g = 0, one is back to
Wasmer and Weil (2001), Section 6. When a ﬁrm starts producing, ε is set at
an initial level ε0 that we assume, for simplicity, to be ﬁxed and common to
all ﬁrms.6 The productivity level ε thereafter changes randomly. At random
dates with Poisson arrival rate λ, a new ε is drawn from a distribution with
support ]−∞, εu] and cdf G(.). The arrival rate λ and the distribution G(.)
are common to all ﬁrms, but both the Poisson dates and realizations of ε
are idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm. We will show below that the viability of the
entrepreneur’s ideas requires, of course, that ε0 be high enough. We will
assume for the moment being that it ishe case.
2 Marginal products in matching are positive but decreasing : h1 > 0, h2 > 0, h11 < 0, h22 < 0.
3 Herafter we simplify the exposition by using the word probability for “instantaneous Poisson probability”
since there is no possible ambiguity.
4 This is an obvious simplification.
5 We impose m1 > 0, m2 > 0, m11 < 0, m22 < 0.
6 We could easily allow for the possibility that the initial ε is random. This would not yield additional insights.
188 Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review 68(1-2), 2002
Life-cycle of the ﬁrm
The life-cycle has four successive phases of stochastic length : In stage 0
(fund raising), prospective entrepreneurs are looking (at a ﬂow sweat cost7
cegt) for a bank willing, in exchange for a future repayment, to ﬁnance
the posting of a job vacancy, while ﬁnanciers are searching for ﬁrms (at a
ﬂow search cost kegt). In stage 1 (recruitment), entrepreneurs have found
a ﬁnancier. Financier and entrepreneur bargain over a contingent ﬁnancial
contract. This contract stipulates : a repayment rule from the ﬁrm to the
banker when cash-ﬂows are positive; a shutdown rule determining in which
states of nature the ﬁrm will be dissolved and the match destroyed; a re-
ﬁnancing rule committing the bank to reinject liquidity into the ﬁrms in
some negative cash-ﬂow states. In stage 2 (creation), the ﬁrm has found a
worker and is at ﬁrst generating exogenous ﬂow output σε0egt. The ﬁrm
pays its workers an exogenous wage ωegt.8 If initially output is not high
enough to cover wage costs (i.e., if σε0 − ω < 0), the banker continues ﬁ-
nancing the ﬁrm and covers the shortfall (−σε0 +ω)egt. If σε0−ω > 0, the
ﬁrm starts repaying the ﬁrm an agreed upon amount ρ(ε0)egt. With Poisson
arrival rate λ > 0, the output of the ﬁrm y jumps to another level σεegt.
Depending on the new value of ε, this brings about either the destruction of
the ﬁrm in very bad states (ε below some cutoﬀ value εd determined later
on), or the reﬁnancing of the ﬁrm by the bank in bad states (intermediate
values, σεd < σε < ω), or a new value of repayment by the ﬁrm ρ(ε)egt > 0
in states with σε > ω. In the ﬁnal stage 3 (destruction), banker and entre-
preneur choose to close down the ﬁrm and to dissolve the match between
ﬁrm and worker because the realization of ε is too unfavorable. In addition
to this endogenous destruction, we add the possibility of exogenous destruc-
tion by natural turnover, with an exogenous probability s.9 Throughout, we
assume that there are no commitment problems for ﬁnanciers or ﬁrms but
discuss at length the relaxation of this assumption later on. All agents are
risk neutral.
We will show below that under these assumptions, there exists, as in
Mortensen–Pissarides (1994), a balanced growth path with a time-invariant
equilibrium unemployment rate.
1.1.2 Optimality conditions
Call B0 (resp. E0) and B1 (resp. E1) the value of a bank (resp. a ﬁrm)
in the fund raising and recruitment stages, B2(ε0) and B2(ε) (resp. E2(ε0)
7 We have assumed that entrepreneurs have no financial resources. For consistency, we therefore hypothesize
that the cost c of searching for a financier is a time, or sweat, cost. This represents the opportunity cost of
time, which in a growing economy is also naturally growing at rate g. For instance, it can be linked to the
marginal utility from consumption.
8 We have solved the more complex case of endogenous wages in Wasmer-Weil (2001) and shown notably
that giving all the barganing power to firms leads to the same results as when wages are assumed exo-
genous. The latter result is not as trivial as it may seem, because a strictly positive bargaining power to
workers leads firms and banks to negociate a rise in repayment ρ(ε) so that workers receive lower wages.
9 Further, the special case λ = 0, g = 0 and σε0 = y > ω corresponds to Wasmer-Weil (2001), Section 3.
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and E2(ε)) its value in the creation and idiosyncratic changes phases, and
ﬁnally B3 (resp. E3) its value in the destruction stage. Let r denote the
(given) riskless rate. The Bellman equations describing the evolution of the
value of the bank and the ﬁrm over the ﬁrst four stages are written down in
the Appendix. We assume that value of a bank destroyed after the ﬁnancier
has met the entrepreneur is B3 = B0 – i.e., that the termination of the
relationship leads to the loss of the speciﬁcity of the entrepreneur-banker
relationship. The same hods for ﬁrms, i.e. E3 = E0.
1.1.3 Bargaining between ﬁnancier and entrepreneur
The contract between a ﬁnancier and an entrepreneur is written after they
meet. The terms of the contract are that the bank will ﬁnance the recruit-
ment cost of the entrepreneurs (γ per unit of time) for as long as it takes
to ﬁnd a worker; when σε < ω, the bank will ﬁnance the deﬁcit as long
as the total surplus F2(ε) + B2(ε) > 0. The bank thus pays an amount
−(σε − ω)ρegt in these times; ﬁnancier and entrepreneur share the surplus
of their relationship according to the following rule : ρ = α(σε − ω) when
the proﬁts are positive. The parameter α is determined through bargaining
in period 1,
β(E1 − E0) = (1− β)(B1 −B0) (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) measures the bargaining power of ﬁnanciers in the credit
relationship. This formulation is equivalent to a generalized Nash bargaining
rule; at each productivity change, the contracting parts check that the total
surplus is still positive. If this is not the case, the match is destroyed :
workers become unemployed, ﬁrms and bank go back to stage 0.
1.2 Aggregate equilibrium
The aggregate equilibrium is determined by three active margins. There are
two entry rules, one for banks (credit creation) and one for entrepreneurs
(business creation) and there is a joint destruction rule determining the
point at which the ﬁrm and the ﬁnancier agree on business destruction. In
addition, there is also a forth, latent margin, not active in steady state but
that could potentially be active if the ﬁnancial commitment described in the
previous section did not hold : as we show below, the margin is given by the
potential (but neither exerted nor anticipated) repudiation of the contract
by the ﬁnancier when B2 < 0 and B2 + F2 > 0.
1.2.1 Entry rules and equilibrium credit market tightness
We assume it is costless to setup a bank or a ﬁrm. Free entry of ﬁnanciers
and entrepreneurs on the credit and labor market then ensures that, in
equilibrium, there are no unexploited proﬁt opportunities :
B0 ≡ 0 and E0 ≡ 0 (2)
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This implies that B˙0 ≡ E˙0 ≡ 0. From the free entry conditions (2) and from
the fund-raising stage value functions (8) and (11), it immediately follows
by reading period 0 Bellman equations backwards that B1 = ke
gt
φp(φ) , while
E1 = ce
gt
p(φ) . Moreover, given the Nash-bargaining equation (1), it is easy
to check that both E1 and B1 need to grow at the same rate. Taking the
ratio of the two latter equations, this will imply that, on a balance-growth
path, tightness of the credit market will be constant : φ∗ = 1−ββ
k
c . Since
φ∗ is constant, and because we will establish below that equilibrium labor
market tightness θ∗ is also constant in equilibrium, asset values in all four
stages grow at rate g.
1.2.2 Destruction rule
Let us denote S(ε) = B2(ε) + E2(ε) the surplus of the match bank-ﬁrm in
stage 2. Adding up equations (10) and (13) and rearranging, we ﬁnd that
S(ε) = (σε−ω)e
gt+λ
∫
max(S(ε′),0)dG(ε′)
r+λ+s−g . The surplus is linear and increasing
in ε. Let εd be the solution of S(εd) = 0. Note that S′(ε) = σe
gt
r+s+λ−g ,
so that we can rewrite the surplus as S(ε) = σ(ε−ε
d)
r+s+λ−g e
gt. The viability
constraint S(ε)  0 therefore imposes the following destruction rule. The
match between ﬁrm and bank is dissolved, and the job destroyed, for all
productivity levels below the cutoﬀ level εd. The relationship between the
ﬁrm and the bank continues otherwise.
To go further, note that S′(ε) = σegt/(r + s + λ − g) which leads to
an alternative characterization of εd :
εd =
ω
σ
− λ
r + s + λ− g
∫ εu
εd
(ε′ − εd)dG(ε′) < ω
σ
(3)
This implies that banker and entrepreneur agree to keep the ﬁrm in opera-
tion for values of ε in the range [εd, ω/σ], i.e., in states of nature in which
productivity is not high enough to generate positive output net of wages
but in which it is nevertheless suﬃcient to generate a positive total sur-
plus. In these states, the bank injects additional liquidity (ω − σεd)egt > 0
in the ﬁrm to keep it alive, and we denote this negative repayment by
ρ(ε) = (σεd − ω)egt from the ﬁrm to the bank.10
How is the destruction cutoﬀ level aﬀected by the parameters of the
model ? By diﬀerentiating equation (3), one can show that ∂εd/∂r > 0,
∂εd/∂λ < 0, ∂εd/∂g < 0, ∂εd/∂s > 0, while ∂εd/∂σ has the same sign
as εd. The total job destruction rate ξ = s + λG(εd) responds to these
parameters in the same way, except for λ for which there is an ambiguity.
10 Negative cash-flows to the firm is a feature already present in Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), but it is irrelevant
in their perfect capital market setup.
Étienne Wasmer, Philippe Weil 191
1.2.3 Equilibrium labor market tightness
To determine the equilibrium number of job creations, we follow Wasmer-
Weil (2001) : it is given by the intersection of two curves, (BB) and (EE),
representing respectively the entry of banks and the entry of entrepreneurs,
in the space (θ, φ). The two curves of course intersect in φ∗ = kc
1−β
β . Their
analytical expression is derived from (9) and (12) in replacing B02 and F
0
2
by their expression. In the present context, if σε0 < ω, and using (1), (2)
and (8)-(13) in Appendix, one obtains after simpliﬁcation the equations
characterizing each curve, in using the notation Π0 = σ(ε
0−εd)
r−g+s+λ :
c
p(φ)
= (1− β) q(θ)
r − g + q(θ)
[
Π− γ
q(θ)
]
, (4)
k
φp(φ)
= β
q(θ)
r − g + q(θ)
[
Π− γ
q(θ)
]
(5)
One can easily prove that the same expression holds when σε0 > ω. Equi-
librium tension in the labor market in the absence of credit frictions is
then θ¯, deﬁned, from equations (5) or (4), by Π0 = γ
q(θ¯)
. This means that
in the absence of credit frictions the value of newly created ﬁrm (mat-
ched with a banker but not with a worker) is zero – which is indeed the
Mortensen-Pissarides free-entry condition for ﬁrms when there are no cre-
dit search frictions. As a consequence, we ﬁnd here that this model nests
i) the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) equilibrium, ii) Wasmer-Weil (2001) and
iii) Pissarides (1990). See Wasmer-Weil (2001) for the proofs and for the fact
that θ∗ < θ¯, i.e. there are fewer job creations. This arises because ﬁnancial
frictions act as an additional, endogenous entry cost to entrepreneurs.
Finally, note that the equilibrium is calculated without expliciting the
bargained value of α, the derivation of which is postponed to next section.
1.3 Monetary policy
On April 18, 2001, when the Federal Reserve bank reduced unexpectedly
the interest rate by half a percentage point, the Dow Jones rose 3.91%.
The Nasdaq went up by 8.12%. Can we explain this diﬀerence by ﬁnancial
fragility of New Economy ﬁrms ?
To answer that question, and in the spirit of the “monetary section”
in Wasmer and Weil (2001), let us have ﬁrms and banks facing a diﬀerent
discount rate, and let’s denote by r∗ < r the discount factor of banks. Any
change in r∗ might be thought as resulting from the intervention of the
monetary authorities. We can thus describe a new channel for monetary
policy : the impact on the valuation of proﬁt perspectives of new ﬁrms and
new projects, and at the same time, the impact on the job destruction
margin through changes in the reservation value εd. Solving for this new set
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of equations, one can show that tightness of the credit market is unchanged,
and that operating ﬁrms have asset values that depends on r∗, and denoted
by E(ε, r∗). We are interested in comparing χold =
∂ lnE2(ε,r
∗)
∂r∗ for proﬁtable
ﬁrms, and χnew =
∂ lnE2(ε,r
∗)
∂r∗ for non-proﬁtable ﬁrms. Using the modiﬁed
equations (8)-(10), and verifying that ∂ε
d(r∗)
∂r∗ > 0, one can check (see the
Appendix for a sketch of the computations) that
χ = |χnew| − |χold| = ∂ε
d
∂r∗
(
1
ε0 − εd −
1
ε− εd
)
> 0 for all ε > ω/σ
This derivative is calculated at r = r∗ but the inequality holds in a neigh-
borhood of r∗ < r. In other words, ﬁrms making losses respond more than
ﬁrms making positive proﬁts to changes in r∗. Interestingly, the diﬀerential
χ is also larger, ceteris paribus, the larger the sensibility of job destruction
to the interest rate, i.e. ∂ε
d
∂r∗ .
2 Some microeconomics of the relation between
ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs
After having established the aggregate equilibrium of the model, and before
deriving some further aggregate results on the links between macroecono-
mic variables and the ﬁnancial intermediaries and testing those links, we
now investigate further some of its microeconomics aspects, and compute
the value of α (the share of cash ﬂows going to the bank in good times)
arising from bargaining in stage 1. We will notably introduce a new notion
of ﬁnancial fragility.
2.1 A deﬁnition of fragility
Let us ﬁrst go back to the Bellman equations in stage 2. We will deﬁne
ﬁnancial fragility for a given ﬁrm as a state in which the total surplus is
positive, i.e. S(ε) = B2(ε) + E2(ε)  0 but in which the asset value of
banks is negative, B2 < 0. These are states of nature in which the ﬁnancing
of ﬁrms with low productivity hangs only on the thread of commitments
(or, alternatively, on reputation considerations). Any weakening of these
commitments would entail the destruction of some or all of these ﬁrms.11
To see why such states exists, we need to compute the value functions
of ﬁrms and banks (see the Appendix). These asset values are represented
graphically in Figure 1 as (linear) functions of ε. This graph indeed shows
11 Note however that the possibility of repudiation of financial contracts is not anticipated, given the assumption
made.
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Banks inject additional liquidity
Figure 1 : Asset values of ﬁrms, banks and total surplus as a function of the level
of technology ε.
why there are values of productivity ε > εd such that, in spite of a positive
surplus, the value for the bank of continuing the relation with the ﬁrm is
negative. This occurs for values of ε between εd and εB < ω, where εB is the
cutoﬀ point such that B2(εB) = 0. These are states of nature in which, were
it not for the contract that it has signed with the ﬁrm (which we assumed
to be irrevocable), the bank would like ex post to get out of the ﬁnancial
relationship that commits it to reﬁnance the ﬁrm and close down the ﬁrm.
One possible measure ﬁnancial fragility as the distance ξ = εB − εd.
2.2 Optimal ﬁnancial contract
The equilibrium repayment of the entrepreneur to her ﬁnancier can now
be calculated. Banker and entrepreneur must share the expected present
discounted value of the proﬁts, net of wages, that the ﬁrm will generate
once it starts operating. We have :
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Proposition 1 : a) If ε0 < εB, the ﬁrm and the bank never contract : the
economy is not viable. b) If ε0 > εB, a fraction
α =


β + (1− β)
[
γ
q(θ)
ω − σεd
r + s + λ− g +
ω − σε0
ω − σεd
]
if ε0  ω/σ,
β + (1− β) γ
q(θ)
σ(ε0 − εd)
r + s + λ− g if ε
0  ω/σ
(6)
of output net of wages goes to the banker.
Proof : See the Appendix.
The equilibrium Nash-bargaining loan contract described by proposi-
tion 1 and equation (6) thus stipulates that the higher labor market tightness
and accordingly, the higher total search costs for ﬁrms, then the higher the
share of output net of wages received by bankers in good times. In addi-
tion, the transfer from the entrepreneur to the ﬁnancier positively depends
on the expected present discounted value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts net of wages
σε0−ω
r−g+s+λe
gt.
3 A numerical illustration applied to the New
Economy
We can now illustrate some recent features of the New Economy (say, the de-
velopment of IT sector, of biotechnologies, etc...) using our framework. The
New Economy can be well described by a few stylized facts. First, the return
of successful businesses is high or very high, and growth prospects in these
sectors are high too. Second, the volatility of these ﬁrms is also very high,
implying a large variance of proﬁtability shocks and frequent job destruc-
tion. Thirdly, the credit market may be extremely frictional for those ﬁrms,
in the sense that the cost of screening projects by ﬁnanciers may be higher
than in traditional sectors. Fourthly, the initial period of the ﬁrm is associa-
ted with more persistence or more incidence of negative cash-ﬂows, leading
to frequent help by ﬁnanciers. Fifth, in the presence of commitments due to
ex-ante negotiations between ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs, the incentives of
ﬁnanciers to renege their commitments may be higher than in traditional
sectors if repudiation costs due to the need to preserve reputation are lower
in emerging sectors. Further, and perhaps less known, there is evidence that
transaction costs in the control and monitoring of businesses by creditors
has recently been drastically reduced due to the use of new technologies. In
a recent paper, Petersen and Rajan (2000) ﬁnd an increase in the average
distance between lenders and borrowers, that we interpret in the context
of our model as an reduction in search costs in the matching process of
the credit market.12 As a whole, one could summarize these aspects by si-
12 Other recent papers have recently studied the importance of distance on borrowing and monitoring costs
(for Belgium see e.g. Degryse and Ongena, 2001, notably their table 5).
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mulating the behavior of two sectors, with the following alternative set of
parameters13 :
Table 1 : Simulation of the model
Old New I New II New III New IV
Initial technology σε0 1.8 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
Wage ω 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Growth rate g 0.025 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Transition rate λ 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Lower bound of σε σεl − 0 0 0 0
Upper bound of σε σεu − 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.9
Screening cost for banks k 0.35 0.35 3.5 3.5 1.75
Bargaining power of banks β 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Share of proﬁts of banks α 0.85 0.86 n.v.∗ 0.70 0.77
Credit market tightness φ 1 1 n.v. 10 5
Labor market tightness θ 1.26 0.91 n.v. 0.29 0.94
Unemployment rate u 0.082 0.129 n.v. 0.171 0.102
Share of ineﬃcient ﬁrms F (εd) − 0.138 n.v. 0.036 0.036
Share of fragile ﬁrms ε
B−εd
εu−εd − 0.045 n.v. 0.117 0.083
∗ : not viable, i.e. proﬁts are insuﬃcient for ﬁrms to enter the market.
The ﬁrst column represents a sector of the traditional (Old) economy,
with a 2.5% growth rate and immediate proﬁts ε0 > ω/σ. There is little
variability in proﬁts, which at the extreme is summarized by λ = 0. Despite
equal bargaining power β = 1/2, banks bargain a repayment α corres-
ponding to 85% of the ﬂow net proﬁts σε0 − ω in order to reimburse the
ﬂow recruiting costs and take account of the discount rate. We showed in
Wasmer-Weil (2001) that this corresponds roughly to an internal rate of
returns for the ﬁnanciers of 22%, i.e. an excess rate of return over the 5%
discount rate of banks of 17%. Equilibrium unemployment is 8.2%.
The second column, a sector of the new economy (New I)14, has a
higher growth rate of proﬁts and transaction costs (5%), but the initial level
of proﬁts is such that the cash-ﬂow is negative in absence of help by the
ﬁnanciers. In addition, there is some variability in productivity, which takes
values in the interval [0, 3.6]. This occurs with intensity λ = 0.3. Given
the computed reservation value εd, F (εd) = 13.8% of the distribution of
shocks leads to job destruction. Accordingly, the total job destruction rate is
s+λF (εd) is 40% higher than in absence of endogenous destruction, i.e. with
13 exogenous destruction s = 0.1; recruiting costs γ = 1.5; scale parameter in labor matching x0 = 1.0;
scale parameter in credit matching p0 = 1; bargaining power of banks β = 0.5; discount rate r = 0.05;
elasticities of matching function η = κ = 0.5; variance of technologies σ = 1.
14 All the sectors are simulated independently of each other.
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λ = 0. This partly explains higher unemployment (12.9%); the other part is
due to lower job creation (lower equilibrium labor market tightness). Lower
job creation is in fact due to lower present discounted proﬁts, due to more
frequent destruction of the ﬁrm, and to lower initial proﬁts experienced by
both ﬁrms and banks : the entrepreneur, initially, obtains nothing, while the
bank further reﬁnance the entrepreneur, as compared to column 1. Finally,
the share of surviving ﬁrms where the ﬁnanciers have an incentive to default
(B2 < 0), computed by ε
B−εd
εu−εd , is about 4.5%.
To have a more realistic picture of the sectors of the New Economy,
one can now simulate the impact of larger screening costs supported by
ﬁnanciers looking for entrepreneurs for businesses with high volatility. In
fact, it seems natural to consider that higher screening costs apply, the
larger the variance of the quality of projects, the higher the uncertainty
about future streams of proﬁts, or, in the case of the New vs. the Old
Economy, the less known the entrepreneurs. Indeed, in the New Economy,
entrepreneurs have no business record, while in the Old Economy, there
are much fewer entrepreneurs looking for a ﬁnancier to ﬁnance a “crazy
idea” : entrepreneurs in old sectors are in small number and usually well
established in the market place. As stated in Petersen and Rajan (2000) :
“Small business lending has historically been very costly, because of the
paucity of information about small ﬁrms and the high costs of the personnel
required to obtain even that information”. Thinking of start-ups in the New
Economy along these lines, we are lead to set k to a higher value, consistent
with a high tightness of the credit market. Indeed, with a value k = 3.5,
one expects an equilibrium value of φ ten times higher.
In column 3 (New II), the upper bound of the distribution is now
σεu = 3.9. Tightness of the credit market is very high (φ = 10). The ﬁnancial
contracts are more balanced, since banks get about 70% of the net proﬁts
in good times. But, the mean proﬁts being low compared to initial entry
costs for banks, tightness of the labor market is low, and unemployment
in the sector is high. The main distinctive feature of this economy is the
high degree of ﬁnancial fragility : in the cross-section of the ﬁrms having
experienced their ﬁrst technological shock, a share of 11.7% is fragile, in the
sense that only the commitment of banks prevent them from letting the ﬁrm
go bankrupt (σεd < σε < ω and ε < εB). In our mind, any aggregate shock
or news announcement about the proﬁtability of the New Economy, such as
the bankruptcy of a symbolic ﬁrms (Boo.com) would serve as a pretext for
these ﬁnanciers to either renege or default from the ﬁnancial contract. If this
happened in such an economy, this would lead to the immediate destruction
of these 12% of ﬁrms, i.e. a sudden inﬂow of 4 to 6% of the workforce into
unemployment.
One of the features of the new economy is also the arrival of strong
productivity gains in the banking sector, in the spirit of Petersen and Rajan
(2000), leading in the column 5 (New III) to a 50% decrease in screening
costs k, leads to an equiproportional decline in credit market tightness, an
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increase in labor market tightness, a better share of proﬁts α for the banks
(due to lower labor market tightness), and a 40% decrease in ﬁnancial fragi-
lity which reaches a share of 8.3% of the surviving ﬁrms having experienced
their ﬁrst technological shock.
4 Empirical illustration
4.1 A testable prediction
We now proceed to a test of the model. One of its major prediction lies
in the link between equilibrium labor market tightness, and the ﬁnancial
frictions as reﬂected by costs c and k. To obtain a more precise view of this
relation, we transform tightness θ in terms of equilibrium unemployment u =
(s + λG(εd))/(s + λG(εd) + θq(θ)). Doing so, we obtain, linearizing around
θ and u = (s + λG(εd))/(s + λG(εd) + θq(θ)), neglecting quadratic terms
in unemployment and using a Cobb-Douglas formulation for the matching
function in the credit market (without any qualitative implication), one
gets :
u− u
u
=
1− η
η
1
p0
kεc1−ε
βε(1−β)1−ε
Π
(7)
The quantity 1p0
kεc1−ε
βε(1−β)1−ε stands for equilibrium ﬁnancial costs. After linea-
rization, this relation states that deviations of unemployment with respect
to frictional speciﬁc country unemployment rate u (due to frictions on the
labor market without credit imperfections) increase with ﬁnancial frictions,
and decrease with aggregate proﬁts, reﬂecting cyclical factors. We will thus
estimate a linear dynamic version of the latter equation :
uit = Di + bu.ui,t−1 + bc.cycleit + bvc.vcit
where Di will reﬂect country-speciﬁc frictional factors on the labor market,
bu will characterize the short-run dynamic of unemployment, cyclical factors
are reﬂected by bc.
4.2 Results
The extensive description of data is in the Appendix. We essentially use a
panel of 17 OECD countries using Jeng and Wells’ (1998) venture capital
data and OECD indicators notably on unemployment, growth and aggre-
gate investment. We obtain 156 observations. Each lag in the speciﬁcation
removes 16 observations, and accordingly, our baseline regression will have
140 observations.
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We try several cyclical controls and several speciﬁcations. All speciﬁ-
cations include lagged unemployment in the regressors. We only report here
the speciﬁcation where the cyclical control is real GDP growth.15 Columns
1 to 7 of each table include country speciﬁc eﬀects. Columns 1, 2 and 3 try
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (with possibly a lag on the cyclical control, and with
the lagged venture capital variable, or including both the contemporaneous
and the lagged venture capital variable). Our preferred speciﬁcation include
contemporaneous and lagged variables, and is reported in column 4. Co-
lumns 5 to 9 test the robustness of this speciﬁcation : notably, columns 5 to
7 add common time eﬀect, country speciﬁc trends or both. Columns 8 and
9 impose a common constant instead of the country ﬁxed eﬀects, with or
without time eﬀect.
As it can be seen from all columns between 1 and 7 in table 2, our lag-
ged venture capital variable is always negative, and remarkably signiﬁcant,
at the 1% level, whereas current venture capital variable is never signiﬁcant.
This suggests the presence of a time-to-build period, or consistently with our
search theory, a time-to-recruit period between investment and the decrease
in unemployment. Durbin-Watson are generally very close to 2. In columns
8 and 9, the coeﬃcient on lagged venture capital is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (7 and 9%), whereas Durbin-Watson is less satisfactory, around 1.5.
There thus seems to be a quite robust negative correlation between
lagged venture capital investment and unemployment, the order of magni-
tude of which is the following : a one standard deviation increase in venture
capital ﬂows relative to GDP (i.e. 0.075) has a short-run eﬀect of −0.25 per-
centage point on unemployment, and−2.4 percentage points in the long-run.
5 Conclusion
The New Economy has recently been associated with large ﬂows of job des-
tructions, bankruptcies and high volatility of the stock exchange, with large
responses of the Nasdaq ﬁrms to the interest rate policy of the Federal Re-
serve Bank. Our model incorporates all these aspects. It deﬁnes the notion
of ﬁnancial fragility, where destruction of jobs may be ineﬃcient, and under-
line that the monetary policy is all the more important than there are ﬁrms
making current losses in expectation of better times. We see the empirical
results of Section 4, not as a formal test of the model, but as an encoura-
gement for macroeconomists to more systematically take into account the
ﬁnancial problems linked to business creation and reﬁnancing.
15 Other specifications can be found in a earlier (IZA DP 179, Aug. 2000) version of Wasmer-Weil (2001) and
do not add much given that the results obtained are identical, except when calculating the magnitude of
the long-run impact of a 1 standard deviation shock on venture capital. This is found to be around −1%
of unemployment, instead of−2.4 with another specification. The short-run impact is however very similar
(−0.20% of unemployment) as with the specification reported in the text.
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Appendix
Asset values
rB0 = −kegt + φp(φ)(B1 −B0) + B˙0, (8)
rB1 = −γegt + q(θ)
[
B2(ε
0)−B1
]
+ B˙1, (9)
rB2(ε) = ρ(ε)e
gt + s[B3 −B2(ε)]
+ λ
∫
{max[B2(ε′), B3]−B2(ε)}dG(ε′) + B˙2(ε) (10)
rE0 = −c + p(φ)(E1 − E0) + E˙0, (11)
rE1 = q(θ)
[
E2(ε
0)− E1)
]
+ E˙1, (12)
rE2(ε) = e
gt[σε− ω − ρ(ε)] + s[E3 − E2(ε)]
+ λ
∫
{max[F2(ε′), F3]− E2(ε)}dG(ε′) + E˙2 (13)
Using a superscript + or − to distinguish between asset values in states with
positive and negative net output σε − ω, we can rewrite the Bellman equations
as :
(r + s + λ− g)B−2 = (σε− ω)egt + λ
∫ ω
εd
B−2 (ε
′)dG(ε′) +
∫ εu
ω
B+2 (ε
′)dG(ε′), (14)
(r + s + λ− g)B+2 = α(σε− ω)egt + λ
∫ ω
εd
B−2 (ε
′)dG(ε′) +
∫ εu
ω
B+2 (ε
′)dG(ε′), (15)
and
(r + s + λ− g)E−2 = 0 + λ
∫ ω
εd
E−2 (ε
′)dG(ε′) +
∫ εu
ω
E+2 (ε
′)dG(ε′), (16)
(r + s + λ− g)E+2 = (1− α)(σε− ω)egt + λ
∫ ω
εd
E−2 (ε
′)dG(ε′) +
∫ εu
ω
E+2 (ε
′)dG(ε′) (17)
The asset values are linear, given t, in ε with slopes
∂B−2 /∂ε =
σ
r + s + λ− g e
gt, ∂B+2 /∂ε =
ασ
r + s + λ− g e
gt
∂E−2 /∂ε = 0, ∂E
+
2 /∂ε =
(1− α)σ
r + s + λ− g e
gt
Using the bargaining condition to simplify the expressions of the intercepts, we
get piecewise linear expressions as displayed in Figure 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is by forward substitution of the Bellman equations. The Bellman equa-
tions in the recruitment stage, (9) and (12), imply that, in equilibrium,
B1 =
− γ + q(θ)B2(ε0)
r − g + q(θ) (18)
and
E1 =
q(θ)E2(ε
0)
r − g + q(θ) (19)
a) If ε0 < εB then from equation (14) the value B2(ε
0) of the bank is negative,
which would implies given equation (18) that B1 < 0 and accordingly, the bank
and the ﬁrm don’t contract. In fact, the bank would not even enter in stage 0.
b) If εB < ε0 < ω/σ, then combining (18), (19), (14) and (16) together with (1) :
1− α = (1− β)
[ − γ
q(θ)
ω − σεd
r + s + λ− g +
σ(ε0 − εd)
ω − σεd
]
(20)
or
α = β + (1− β)
[ − γ
q(θ)
ω − σεd
r + s + λ− g +
ω − σε0
ω − σεd
]
(21)
c) If ε0 > ω/σ, then combining (18), (19), (14) and (16) together with (1)
α = β + (1− β) γ
q(θ)
σ(ε0 − εd)
r + s + λ− g (22)
The repayment share is higher, the higher the search cost relative to the initial
total surplus, and of course, higher, the higher β.
Proof of Equation (7)
From either equation (5) or (4), and using the equilibrium value for φ, equilibrium
labor market tightness satisﬁes
γ/q(θ∗) = γ/q(θ¯)− c
1− β [p(
1− β
β
k
c
)]−1 < γ/q(θ¯) (23)
Since q′(.) < 0, it follows that θ∗ < θ¯.
Monetary Policy
First, rewrite all the Bellman equations with a diﬀerent discount rate for ﬁrms
(r) and banks (r∗). Then, use the surplus sharing rule to determine the new
value of (1 − α) which will be used to calculate the new value of E2(ε, r∗). One
obtains E2(ε, r
∗) = ε
0−εd
r∗+λ+s−g
1−β
β
1
r∗+q
r+q +
1−β
β
r+λ+s−g
r∗+λ+s−g
for unproﬁtable ﬁrms and
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E2(ε, r
∗) = ε−ε
d
r∗+λ+s−g
1−β
β
1
1+ 1−β
β
r+λ+s−g
r∗+λ+s−g
for proﬁtable ﬁrms. It is then easy to
calculate the logarithm, make a ﬁrst-order approximation of the last fraction in
each equation, calculate the derivative of each of them and ﬁnally apply them at
r = r∗.
Data description
We build a panel of OECD countries using two sources of data. First, some usual
macroeconomic indicators on unemployment, aggregate investment, real and no-
minal GDP were compiled from the OECD national accounts and labor force
statistics. These data cover the period 1960-1999. Second, we used data on ven-
ture capital published in Jeng and Wells (1998, pp. 64-65, tables 11-12). As they
very carefully report it, venture capital investment is the sum of start-up, seed and
expansion investment. Early stage investment, which we ﬁnd to be the most si-
gniﬁcant variable, is deﬁned as the sum of start-up and seed. These data are used
to construct an unbalanced panel covering the period 1986-1995 for 20 OECD
countries. New Zealand, Australia, Germany and Japan were removed from our
sample given the lack of observations or consistency of the data. We thus build a
panel with the 16 following countries : the US, Canada, the UK, Ireland, France,
Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Finland,
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. All countries thus have 10 venture capital obser-
vations, except Norway and Finland (8 observations).
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Table 2 : Unemployment impact of venture capital (controlling by GDP
growth); dependent variable : unemployment∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unemployment rate (−1) 1.02 1.01 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.73 0.73 1.01 1.02
(29.80) (28.83) (26.42) (25.84) (21.07) (14.79) (10.28) (62.33) (60.68)
GDP growth rate −44.95 −44.85 −29.80 −29.78 −28.44 −22.55 −21.17 −31.80 −26.30
(−17.21)(−16.90)(−10.03)(−10.09) (−6.19) (−7.12) (−4.25) (−10.10) (−5.92)
GDP growth rate (−1) − − −20.69 −20.82 −21.15 −24.63 −27.29 −15.98 −17.53
(−7.32) (−7.37) (−5.25) (−8.73) (−6.79) (−5.06) (−4.01)
Venture capital rate − 0.03 − 0.57 0.27 0.13 −0.08 −0.23 0.36
(0.03) (0.71) (0.28) (0.14) (−0.07)(−0.24) (0.32)
Venture capital rate (−1) −4.15 −4.15 −3.38 −3.79 −3.78 −3.65 −3.70 −2.29 −2.54
(−4.41)(−3.90)(−3.25)(−3.12)(−2.98)(−2.54)(−2.45)(−1.73)(−1.84)
Fixed country eﬀects / constant − − − − − − − 1.29 0.80
(9.95) (3.66)
USA 1.06 1.08 1.91 1.92 1.63 2.76 −2.82 − −
CAN 1.35 1.38 2.52 2.53 2.24 −3.56 −9.26 − −
GBR 1.04 1.07 2.15 2.19 1.90 2.20 −2.30 − −
IRE 2.47 2.52 4.38 4.46 4.08 9.23 3.68 − −
FRA 1.18 1.21 2.49 2.54 2.22 7.54 2.61 − −
SPA 1.51 1.57 3.95 4.05 3.68 −5.63 −10.24 − −
ITA 0.89 0.93 2.35 2.41 2.07 18.37 13.17 − −
POR 1.77 1.79 2.59 2.60 2.30 4.24 −0.85 − −
HOL 1.00 1.02 2.08 2.10 1.80 −10.03 −16.20 − −
BEL 1.90 1.93 3.13 3.19 2.88 −8.87 −13.67 − −
DEN 0.99 1.02 2.00 2.04 1.73 0.61 −4.57 − −
NOR 1.75 1.76 3.38 2.39 2.04 −11.50 −19.54 − −
SWE 1.15 1.16 1.61 1.63 1.34 −19.08 −23.41 − −
FIN 2.09 2.12 3.23 3.26 2.92 −69.01 −72.36 − −
AUT 1.26 1.27 1.83 1.85 1.54 7.30 1.88 − −
SWI 1.07 1.07 1.35 1.36 1.08 −2.10 −6.96 − −
Common time eﬀects No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country speciﬁc trends No No No No No Yes Yes No No
Weighted Statistics
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97
F-statistics 6077.55 3864.46 4175.26 3328.53 674.54 932.82 444.65 1338.54 330.51
Durbin-Watson 2.05 2.04 1.90 1.90 1.84 2.19 2.13 1.46 1.49
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
∗ : Estimation method : Generalized Least Square Dummy Variables (with cross-section
weights); t-statistics are in parentheses.
